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Abstract This paper explores the ways in which policies
for national identity formation and internationalization
interact to complement and contradict each other in the
context of global higher education. These themes are
explored by comparing recent policies in two countries in
East Asia, a part of the world currently on the rise in the
global hierarchy of higher education (Altbach in Tert Educ
Manag 10:3–25, 2004; Marginson in High Educ 4(1),
2011b). China and Japan are presented as case studies, with
a focus on the ways the two countries have pursued both
higher education internationalization and nationalist agen-
das through education more broadly. The paper then turns
to a discussion of the factors that might explain these
approaches as well as the dilemmas that arise from the
interaction of these policy agendas in the context of global
higher education. The paper argues that while increasing
global competitiveness through HE internationalization
may prove beneficial to individual nation-states in the short
term, countries in East Asia should consider the potential
pitfalls of becoming too singly focused on competitiveness
at the expense of mutual understanding and peaceful
international relations in the region. Furthermore, the
continued push to create uncritical nationalistic citizens
threatens to undermine the goals of internationalization and
may be detrimental to efforts at HE regional cooperation
and integration. The paper concludes with recommenda-
tions that the two countries consider the potential benefits
of global citizenship education and the expansion of
regionally focused study abroad programs to help develop
graduates with the global competencies conducive to both
national competitiveness and regional cooperation.
Keywords Internationalization  Higher education  Global
competitiveness  Nationalism  East Asia
Introduction
In the current era of globalization, governments and higher
education institutions (HEIs) worldwide are striving to
improve global competitiveness both at the national and
institutional levels. The challenge for higher education is
twofold. First, university graduates must be equipped with
the knowledge and skills needed to compete in increasingly
globalized knowledge economies. Second, the growing
relevance of international rankings means universities
themselves must respond strategically to increased global
competition regarding research, innovation, and interna-
tional reputation (Marginson and van der Wende 2007). A
common response to these challenges has been investment
by governments and HEIs in higher education (HE) inter-
nationalization, including the development of universities
into global hubs for research and learning (Huang 2007).
Policymakers argue this will lead to the path-breaking
innovation and creation of ‘global human resources’ nec-
essary to drive economic growth and foster national
competitiveness.
In addition to utilizing higher education as a tool for the
development of human capital and economic growth,
nation-states use education as a political tool to inculcate
national identities (Vickers 2011). In many countries,
national identity formation is promoted during the com-
pulsory years of schooling through state-mandated history,
moral, and civic education curricula. The rationales driving
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these agendas vary, but most have been aimed at the
legitimization and institutionalization of particular
arrangements of state governance in the face of both
internal and external pressures.
From an economic perspective, the dual policy agendas
for national identity formation and HE internationalization
appear to go hand in hand. Historically, the creation of a
patriotic citizenry has been conducive to fostering human
resources capable of serving national interests and fuelling
economic development (Green 2013). Likewise, interna-
tionalization of education may enable the provision of
relevant knowledge and skills necessary for national
competitiveness in today’s rapidly globalizing economies.
However, these agendas contain within them inherent
tensions, especially when played out in university settings.
HE internationalization stems originally from an ethos
based on international peace, academic collaboration, and
mutual understanding (Kreber 2009). Similarly, the uni-
versity itself has cosmopolitan DNA, with the first 2000 of
its 2500-year history constituting a ‘wandering scholar
model’ characterized by autonomy and freedom from state
control (Kerr 1990, p. 7). Arguably, contemporary forms of
both internationalization and the university have shifted
away from these cosmopolitan ideals towards a nationally-
bounded economic orientation. Shaped by state-driven
neoliberal reforms and strategies for global competitive-
ness, HE has been redefined in recent decades through
processes of commodification, marketization, and corpo-
ratization (Mok 2003, 2007; Olssen and Peters 2005).
Nevertheless, universities continue evolving in today’s era
of globalization and are engaged in an ongoing negotiation
of their roles as both national and global actors. While
attempting to further national interests in response to state
funding and policy directives on the one hand, they also
play a key role as global institutions through the facilitation
of cross-border flows of knowledge, people, culture, and
innovation (Marginson and van der Wende 2007). This
dual role of higher education thus presents a paradox for
policy agendas aimed at national identity formation and
economically driven internationalization: education poli-
cies with these aims may clash with the extant cos-
mopolitan aspects of internationalization and with what
Marginson (2011a) describes as higher education’s role in
contributing to the ‘global public good’.
This paper will explore the ways in which policies for
national identity formation and internationalization interact
to complement and contradict each other in the context of
global higher education. These themes will be explored by
comparing recent policies in two countries in East Asia, a
part of the world currently on the rise in the global hier-
archy of higher education (Altbach 2004; Marginson
2011b). China and Japan were selected as case studies, and
the following research questions were addressed:
1. In what ways have the two countries pursued nation-
alist agendas through education?
2. In what ways have the two countries approached HE
internationalization?
3. What factors might explain these approaches?
4. What dilemmas arise from the interaction of these
policy agendas in the context of global higher
education?
In addition to having a complex and often conflictual
relationship with one another in the modern era, Japan and
China share a number of important similarities and differ-
ences with regard to higher education. As of 2011, China had
1887 public HEIs and 836 private HEIs (UNESCO 2014). In
2013, Japan had 86 national and 90 local public universities
and 606 private institutions (MEXT n.d.). While Japan has a
higher percentage of private universities than China, schol-
ars argue the HE systems in both countries are among the
most privatized because of their heavy reliance on financial
contributions of students and their families, and their
increasing tendency to follow ‘market and competition-ori-
ented institutional governance as private institutions or
corporatized institutions under the idea of new public man-
agement (NPM)’ (Yonezawa et al. 2014, p. 11). While HE
worldwide is increasingly being shaped by neoliberal influ-
ences such as NPM, one commonality still found in both
China and Japan is a strong nation-state steering and control
of education (Marginson 2011b). According to Marginson
(ibid, p. 595), ‘[d]espite the use of indirect NPM steering,
states often continue to exercise detailed controls over pro-
gram contents, personnel management, and research’. Heavy
state involvement in education has a long history in the East
Asian region, and today nations continue to view HE as a
means of producing the human resources and research nee-
ded for national development and global competitiveness.
Table 1 below highlights a number of other notable com-
parisons between HEIs in the two countries, including statis-
tics about HE enrolment, main disciplinary foci, research, and
international mobility.
In addition to the comparisons of HE highlighted above,
Japan and China share a number of broader similarities that
are relevant to this study. One shared characteristic found
in both countries is the influence of Confucianism on
public attitudes towards education and the role of the state
(ibid.). This tradition provides the cultural conditions that
support the roles of the state, encourages social competition
and investment in education by families, and fosters the
widespread support for public investment in scientific
research (ibid).
A third feature is both of these nation-sates have his-
torically pushed strong nationalist agendas through their
education systems (Vickers 2009). Finally, as of 2009,
domestic students accounted for the overwhelming
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majority of tertiary education enrolments in both cases, at
nearly 97 % in Japan (OECD 2011) and 99 % in China
(UNESCO 2013). Thus, the vast majority of university
students in each case would have been exposed to state-
sanctioned curricula for national identity formation during
their compulsory years of schooling.
Literature review
The following section will contextualize the above research
questions within relevant scholarly debates and introduce
theoretical frameworks to inform comparative analysis of
the two cases. The topics to be covered are theories of HE
internationalization, the role of universities in contributing
to the ‘global public good’, and debates surrounding con-
ceptions of nationalism with particular reference to the East
Asian ‘developmental states’.
HE internationalization in the era of global
competitiveness
Internationalization has been defined by Knight (2003,
p. 2) as ‘the process of integrating an international, inter-
cultural or global dimension into the purpose, function or
delivery of … education’. This broad definition can be
applied to a wide range of activities informed by differing
motivations and objectives. Goodman (2007, p. 71) argues
that multiple and contested interpretations of the term have
resulted in its becoming a ‘multivocal symbol’ that benefits
‘universities in that it allows a wide variety of programmes
and interest groups to flourish alongside each other despite
the fact that their ideas might appear contradictory’ (ibid,
p. 86). These interpretations often manifest in forms of
internationalization that tend towards either global com-
petition or collaboration and cooperation. Table 2 below
provides a conceptual framework outlining four possible
manifestations of HE internationalization.
Worldwide, approaches to HE internationalization have
shifted focus in recent decades from a ‘cooperative effort
with its rationale based primarily on political, cultural, and
academic arguments’ towards an economically motivated
rationale (Kreber 2009, p. 4). As indicated in Table 2, the
factors that have contributed to this shift relate to pressures
imposed on nations and HEIs to remain internationally
competitive in response to economic globalization. The
globalized higher education marketplace requires HEIs to
strategically position themselves in a highly competitive
landscape that transcends national borders. HEIs that have
historically been highly regarded in national contexts are
Table 1 Comparisons of tertiary education in China and Japan
China Japan
Enrolment
Total enrolment 41,924,198* 3,862,749*
% Female 51.1* 46.6*
% Private … 79
Ratio of undergraduate to graduate enrolment (2011 or most recent
year available)
8:1 10:1
Research and academic disciplines
Main disciplinary foci (2008–2012) Engineering, physics, and computer
science
Engineering, physics, and
medicine
R&D expenditure as % of GDP 1.84 3.39
Compound annual growth rate of publications 17.8 % 1.7 %
Main international collaboration partners USA, Japan, China (Hong Kong) USA, China, Germany
International mobility
Students from abroad studying in given country 79,638 151,461
Mobile students from East Asia and the Pacific studying in given
country
… 134,142
Top five destinations (host countries) for outbound mobile students USA (178,890)
Japan (94,382)
Australia (90,175)
UK (65,906)
Korea, Rp. (47,477)
USA (20,883)
UK (3206)
Australia (2117)
France (1685)
Germany (1562)
* Most recent year available from UNESCO Institute of Statistics. For China, this was 2014, for Japan, 2013. Other data compiled from
UNESCO (2014)
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now being held to global standards, compared against the
world’s top-tier research institutions.
The types of internationalization activities a nation or
institution is able to pursue are determined largely by its
position in the global higher education landscape.
According to Huang (2007, p. 52), internationalization
activities can be distinguished into three types: an import-
oriented type, an import and export type, and an export-
oriented type. Table 3 below outlines a framework for
determining which type of HE internationalization best
applies to a given nation/institution.
Countries that fall into the export-oriented category in
Table 3 below are typically those in the Anglosphere. At
present, Anglosphere nations and their world-renowned
research universities hold the top positions in the global
higher education hierarchy (QS 2015; ARWU 2014). As
the English language has become the lingua franca for
scientific research, international academic publications,
and the world of global business, there is a strong world-
wide draw to HEIs that can offer high-quality programs in
English (Altbach 2004). Thus, another factor that influ-
ences a nation’s global position is whether or not English is
used as a national or major language and incorporated into
instruction at universities (Huang 2007, p. 52).
Today, many emergent East Asian HEIs fall into the
import- and export-oriented category. In order to maintain,
leverage, and improve upon their positions in the global
HE landscape, many have implemented strategies to
internationalize their campuses in a variety of ways.
One approach has been to offer courses in English. This
has enabled increased inward mobility of students who
would otherwise be unable to participate due to linguistic
constraints. However, in some cases, the importation of
English as a medium of instruction has brought with it a
range of issues, including difficulties for domestic students
and resistance from staff in adapting to this new medium of
instruction (Tsuneyoshi 2005). As indicated in Table 3
below, this is one example of how conflicts can arise
between international imports and national characteristics.
A further challenge is presented in the growing preva-
lence of another export, transnational education. In addi-
tion to the power of export-oriented Western universities
offering world-class programs in English to draw promis-
ing students and academics overseas, many HEIs from the
Anglosphere have begun opening branch campuses in
Asian countries to compete with local institutions (Yone-
zawa et al. 2014).
To respond to these encroaching external pressures,
governments in East Asian countries have endorsed uni-
versity internationalization initiatives. In Japan, the gov-
ernment has invested ¥ 7.7 billion to fund its ‘Top Global
University Project’, which aims to boost the number of
universities entering the top 100 global rankings and to
provide ‘prioritized support for the world-class and
Table 2 Rationales for higher education internationalization
Rationale (type) Description
Political Related to issues of national security, stability and peace
Academic Linked to the goal of achieving international standards for teaching and research
A belief that teaching, research and service activities are enhanced through internationalization
Cultural/social Emphasis on preservation of national culture, understanding foreign languages and cultures, and respect for diversity
Economic Direct response to market forces associated with economic globalization
Emphasis on developing human resources needed for the nation to stay internationally competitive
Adapted from Qiang (2003) (cited in Kreber 2009, p. 4)
Table 3 Three types of internationalization of higher education
Import-oriented Import- and export-oriented Export-oriented
Country Most developing countries, or
countries with colonial
experiences
Most non-English-speaking developed
countries and some developing countries
with their unique cultures or traditions
Especially English-speaking developed
countries
Characteristics Seeking competent
professional personnel but
having a weak modern
higher education system
Importing English-language products to
enhance the quality of learning and
research, and exporting educational
programmes with distinctive characteristics
Attracting foreign students from developing
countries and non-English-speaking
countries; and exporting transnational
education services as trade
Issues and
challenges
Brain drain and loss of
national identity
Conflicts between foreign imports and
national characteristics
Quality assurance and negative effects
resulting from commercialism of higher
education
Source: Huang (2007)
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innovative universities’ that lead the internationalization of
Japanese society (MEXT 2014). This is to be achieved
through structural changes to improve global competitive-
ness, improvements to the ratio of foreign faculty and
students, and through an increase in the provision of lec-
tures in English (ibid.).
China has sought to enhance the global competitiveness
of its HEIs through investment in its top universities as
well, with an emphasis on rapidly improving its capacity
for producing high-quality research. This investment is
producing significant results. In 1995, China was the 12th
largest producer of science papers in the world and is now
the second largest having surpassed Japan in 2007 (Mar-
ginson 2014). Like Japan’s Top Global University Project,
China has also sponsored an initiative (the 211 Project) that
aims to ‘equip China with one hundred ‘world-class uni-
versities’ to enhance high-level technological and man-
agerial skills and stem—or even reverse—the flow of
students travelling to prestigious institutions in the West in
search of such skills’ (Vickers 2007, p. 81).
HE as a global public good
While the motivations that drive HE internationalization
policies have shifted to a more economic orientation, the
outcomes of internationalization activities continue to have
broader impacts that evoke higher education’s cosmopoli-
tan roots. For example, the university’s production of
knowledge and its diffusion across borders through inter-
nationalization activities has been described by Marginson
(2011a) as a ‘global public good’. Kaul et al. (1999, p. 16)
define global public goods as:
outcomes … that tend towards universality in the
sense that they benefit all countries, population
groups and generations. At a minimum, a global
public good would meet the following criteria: its
benefits extend to more than one group of countries
and do not discriminate against any population group
or any set of generations, present or future.
The ‘universality’ of cross-border knowledge transfer
facilitated through practices of internationalization poses a
challenge to policy agendas aimed at attaining the self-
interested objectives of nation-states. In addition to
national competitiveness, these aims often manifest in
policies designed to inculcate nationalist identities, which,
through processes of fostering notions of a national ‘self’
that is distinct from a foreign ‘other’, run counter to the
ideals of universality and cosmopolitanism. Theories out-
lining the forms, causal factors and purposes of these
processes with reference to East Asia are discussed in the
following two sections.
Nationalism in the East Asian ‘developmental states’
Nationalism, a topic of substantial scholarly debate, can
manifest in a variety of forms. According to Ignatieff
(1993, p. 4), one such form is civic nationalism, which is
organized around the notion of an inclusive community of
‘equal rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attach-
ment to a shared set of political practices and values’.
Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, is premised on the notion
that a community is bound together through an inherited
ethnicity and culture (ibid.). In practice, states use nation-
alism as a tool to obtain and exercise power (Breuilly
1993). Nationalist policies can be defensive attempts to
ensure the survival and development of fragile nation-
states, while others can morph into violent and militaristic
ultra-nationalisms like those found during the era of
imperialism. With regard to the East Asian developmental
states, the various nationalisms that emerged have been
described as ‘situational’ (Johnson 1982, cited in Green
2013, p. 343). From this perspective, nationalisms arise
from particular historical conditions, both internal to the
nation and often in reaction to external pressures. The
nationalisms that have evolved in China and Japan are thus
unique to their own specific contexts, but they have both
served to legitimize the state and foster the national unity
deemed crucial for economic development.
The following section will juxtapose and explore in
more detail recent trends in nationalist policies in China
and Japan, highlighting potential causal factors that might
explain their existence. This will be followed by a com-
parison of HE internationalization policies in the two cases,
with reference to the way these policies interact with
nationalist agendas.
National identity formation in China and Japan
Both China and Japan have utilized education to deliver
nationalist messages to their people (for examples of Japan,
see Aspinall 2002; Lincicome 2009; McCullough 2008; for
China, see Vickers 2011; Wang 2008; Zhao 1998). The
discourses embedded in these messages have evolved over
time, but have continued to be inextricably linked to these
nation-states’ relationships with the world beyond their
borders. A brief historical account will put current policies
in context.
In the 1850s, the imposition of powerful Western forces
manifested in the arrival of Matthew Perry’s ‘black ships’
triggered Japan’s reactionary process of rapid moderniza-
tion and national identity development (Green 2013). Early
forms of nationalism were thus an attempt to rally the
nation to a unified position of self-defence against an
immediate and daunting foreign threat (Anderson 2006).
One vehicle by which nationalist agendas were delivered
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was the education system, in the form of curricula known
as ‘moral education’ (Rosegaard 2011). As Japan devel-
oped in a competitive imperialistic era, over time the
nationalism that was originally defensive became increas-
ingly aggressive and militaristic. Moral education, too,
evolved from a program aimed at teaching ethics and
loyalty to the Emperor to one that subjugated and indoc-
trinated the Japanese people with an ideology of ‘ethno-
centric imperialism’ (Hoffman 1991, cited in Rosegaard
2011, p. 88). Under the US Occupation after WWII, moral
education was removed from the curriculum but reap-
peared with the departure of the Americans in 1958 and has
remained to this day (ibid.). According to Doak
(1996, 1997), the twentieth century was a period in which
various contested ideologies of nationalism informed
political debate in Japan. One dominant form that has
persisted and can still be found in policy rhetoric today is
ethnic nationalism (ibid.).
Like Japan, China developed its form of nationalism in
response to the arrival of Western powers (and then
Japan), all of whom possessed superior military strength
and posed an unprecedented threat to Chinese culture
(Zhimin 2005). China’s leadership recognized, like
Japan’s did during the Meiji period, that the external
threat of foreign powers warranted a nationalist identity to
unite its people.
China has experienced its own unique historical tra-
jectory, the last 65 years of which has been dominated by
the Communist Party of China (CCP). The contemporary
Chinese nation-state has been rapidly evolving since the
late 1970s from an ideologically socialist past into a new
form in which the authoritarianism of the nominally
socialist CCP co-exists with full-fledged market capital-
ism. This shift has entailed a new approach to legit-
imizing the authoritarian rule of the party; instead of a
program of indoctrination based on Marxist–Leninist and
Maoist ideologies, the CCP has sought to reframe its
legitimacy through the inculcation of nationalistic iden-
tities (Zhao 1998). The 1980s saw widespread disillu-
sionment with Communism, social unrest and the
subsequent pro-democracy movement culminating in the
Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, all of which indicated
to party leaders that a new form of patriotic indoctrina-
tion was urgently needed (ibid.). According to Zhao
(1998),
Chinese Communist leaders began to place emphasis
on the party’s role as the paramount patriotic force
and guardian of national pride in order to … hold the
country together during the period of rapid and tur-
bulent transformation. By identifying the party with
the nation, the regime would make criticism of the
party line an unpatriotic act (Zhao 1998, p. 289).
The goal to fuse the concepts of party and nation in Chi-
na’s collective consciousness manifested in a new program
of ‘patriotic education’ (ibid.). The approach was markedly
different from Japan’s. In contrast to Japan’s predominantly
ethno-cultural nationalism, the CCP recognized that the
multi-ethnic makeup of China’s population presented risks
to the cultivation of an ethnic nationalism focused on the Han
majority. It sought instead to develop a ‘state-led’ form of
nationalism that instilled a ‘love of country’ (aiguo), and
insisted that all peoples within China’s borders are members
of a unified nation bound together by the CCP (ibid, p. 291).
Potential criticisms of the party for growing social inequal-
ities were shifted onto foreign powers such as Japan and the
USA, who were blamed through xenophobic messages for
‘keeping China down’ (Vickers 2011).
The early 1980s saw a number of changes take place in
Japan as well, notably Prime Minister Yasuhiro Naka-
sone’s promotion of the concept of ‘healthy nationalism’
(Aspinall 2002; Hood 1999). The following quotes eluci-
date Nakasone’s definition of the concept:
[I]t is when a race or group of people who share a
common destiny…make every effort to enable the
country to grow and prosper politically, economi-
cally, and culturally. It is when they have their own
identity, or sense of self, in the world politically,
economically, culturally, and otherwise and co-op-
erate to contribute to that identity. Without this, there
is no way that a nation will be able to stand on ‘‘its
own two feet.’’ (Nakasone 1987, cited in Hood 1999)
…a nationalism that endeavors to foster self-identity
in this sense is completely justifiable nationalism.
And we must teach this through education (Nakasone
1987, cited in Lincicome 2009, p. xix)
Nakasone’s references to ‘race’, ‘destiny’, and a singu-
lar cultural identity point to the persistence of ethnic forms
of nationalism in Japan. He explicitly states the importance
of conferring these values through education. Today, the
Japanese state’s nationalist rhetoric has shifted somewhat.
Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promotes a more civic
version of Nakasone’s ‘healthy nationalism’ which ‘en-
courages the Japanese people to be proud of their country
while at the same time respectful of contemporary Japan’s
democratic political system and supportive of a peaceful
East Asian regional order’ (Berger 2014, p. 2). This more
outward-facing nationalism has prompted the addition of a
global component to recent versions of the moral education
curricula. The Ministry of Education (MEXT) Outline of
the Revised Basic Act on Education advocates for:
Fostering an attitude of respecting our traditions and
culture, loving the country and region that nurtured
them, respecting other countries, and contributing to
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world peace and the development of the international
community (MEXT 2006, p. 2)
While there is still a clear message of patriotism, love of
country also expands to include the ‘region’, and respect
for other countries and a mission of contributing to world
peace are included. The addition of this global component
may serve to foster the development of more cosmopolitan
identities alongside notions of patriotic loyalty to Japan.
In China, cosmopolitan outlooks are still absent from
moral education policy documents. A recent example is a
2006 policy implemented by the CCP that was aimed at
intensifying moral education and constructing ‘a harmo-
nious socialist society’ (Camicia and Zhu 2011). A central
component to this policy was the ‘Eight Honors and Eight
Shames’ (ibid, p. 607).
These are translated into English as follows:
The Eight Honors and Eight Shames
• Love the country; do it no harm
• Serve the people; never betray them
• Follow science; discard superstition
• Be diligent; not indolent
• Be united, help each other; make no gains at other’s
expense
• Be honest and trustworthy; do not sacrifice ethics for
profit
• Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless
• Live plainly, work hard; do not wallow in luxuries and
pleasures (ibid, p. 608).
Inspection of the list reveals an obvious nationalistic
discourse. At the top of the list, the first couplet calls for an
uncritical patriotism and doing the nation no harm (ibid,
p. 609). Never betraying fellow countrymen, discipline and
lawfulness all make the list, but unlike Japan’s latest, more
globalized moral curriculum, there is no reference to the
world outside of national borders.
Nationalism in HE
Signs of state-sanctioned nationalist agendas can be found
on university campuses as well. In Japan, universities have
recently experienced pressure from the government to raise
the national flag and sing the national anthem at cere-
monies and other events (Japan Times 2015). In China, the
CCP’s ‘patriotic education’ program has extended from
kindergarten all the way to the university level. An
example is the ‘I am Chinese’ program implemented at
universities, which taught students of ‘the ‘great achieve-
ments’ of the Chinese people and especially the Commu-
nist Party’ (Zhao 1998, p. 293).
The persistence of nationalist agendas, especially at the
HE level, risks obfuscating the realization of objectives of
states and HEIs wishing to internationalize universities.
These challenges will be discussed in the following section
outlining approaches to HE internationalization in the two
countries.
Approaches to HE internationalization in Japan
and China
Japan has worked towards the vision of internationalization
(kokusaika) in one form or another since the 1970s (Takagi
2009). While many policies have been implemented over
the past 45 years, some scholars argue the term has
devolved into a buzzword with multiple meanings, serving
actors with wide-ranging motivations (Goodman 2007). In
1983, Nakasone, the same prime minister that promoted the
concept of ‘healthy nationalism’, implemented a policy
with the intention of recruiting 100,000 international stu-
dents to Japanese universities. At the time, the policy’s
objectives were to improve the relationship with neigh-
bouring Asian countries through exchange, demonstrate the
nation’s presence on the world stage, and ‘rehabilitate
Japan’s image of being a beneficiary, rather than a bene-
factor, of the world’s intellectual currents’ (Ishikawa 2011,
p. 209).
Today, the target number has increased to 300,000 but
the motivations have shifted, reflecting the worldwide trend
of HE marketization and the adoption of an economic
orientation towards internationalization (Kreber 2009).
Instead of the political, cultural and academic motives that
fuelled early efforts at internationalization, today’s goals
focus on recruiting high-quality foreign students and
scholars to contribute to the research agendas and overall
competitiveness of Japanese universities (Takeda 2006;
Ninomiya et al. 2009; cited in Ishikawa 2011, p. 209). In
addition to the 300,000 Plan, a number of policies have
been pushed by government calling for the creation of
world-class ‘international centres for learning’ to foster
global competitiveness (Tsuneyoshi 2005; Ishikawa 2011).
The same time period has seen dramatic changes to
higher education in China. In 1976, nearly all HEIs in
China had been closed or abolished as a result of the
Cultural Revolution (Huang 2003). The subsequent
30 years saw the number of HEIs dramatically increase to
over 3000 institutions enrolling over 24.5 million students,
making China the largest HE provider in the world (Wang
2009). China’s open-door policy and economic reforms
aimed at achieving ‘the four modernizations’: the mod-
ernization of industry, agriculture, defence, and science/
technology (Huang 2003). To this end, the government
recognized the need to train experts and high-level pro-
fessionals who could facilitate the modernization of the
nation, and so provided financial support to students and
scholars to study abroad at foreign universities. In addition
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to outward mobility, this period saw the introduction and
translation of foreign textbooks, and an increased provision
of English-language education. The activities of this phase
in China’s development are an example of the import-ori-
ented position described in Huang’s framework for HE
internationalization; at the start, Chinese HEIs did not have
the capacity to foster economic growth and so had to
import knowledge and models of teaching and learning
from abroad.
Today, HE internationalization in both countries is now
very much about economic competition and strategic
position-taking on the global stage. The most recent iter-
ation of Japan’s kokusaika policy is Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe’s ‘Top Global Universities’ initiative. With this policy
Abe hopes to usher more Japanese universities into the top
100 world rankings. However, skeptics point to the long
list of similar policies that have failed in the past.
Japan’s HE internationalization policies have often gar-
nered labels such as ‘contradictory’ and ‘paradoxical’ (Ishi-
kawa 2011; Fitzpatrick 2014). The reason, it is argued, is
because Japan’s attempts at internationalization are infused
with ‘a desire to protect and promote Japanese national
identity’ (Burgess 2010). Japan’s kokusaika has been descri-
bed as form of ‘modernist nationalism’, with the ultimate aim
being to ‘reinforce the idea of Japanese as being different from
all other people and for that difference to be properly under-
stood outside Japan’ (Goodman 2007, p. 72). Furthermore,
this monocultural nationalist approach to internationalization
has been criticized for overlooking the already international
nature of Japanese society (Horie 2002). According to Tsu-
neyoshi (2011, p. 120), internationalization policies in Japan
typically exclude recognition of the existing multiculturalism
in the country, and instead focuses on ‘English, informational
technology, and global competition’. For example, up until
2003, it was easier for foreign students from abroad to enter
Japanese universities than it was for ‘foreign’ students
attending unrecognized non-Japanese schools inside Japan
(Goodman 2007). In addition to overlooking the Korean,
Chinese, South American, and other minority populations
within Japan, images of kokusaika tend to ignore Japan’s
immediate neighbours with which Japan’s ‘past, present, and
future are most intimately intertwined’ in favour of an
approach that is decidedly Western-facing:
Statements associated with the Super Global program
refer repeatedly to the prioritization of links with
‘outstanding European and American universities’.
Meanwhile, political media and educational debate
on foreign languages focuses exclusively on English
(Rappleye and Vickers 2015).
The orientation towards the Anglosphere may be
reflective of the positions universities in English-speaking
countries hold in the global higher education landscape. In
order to be competitive, Japanese institutions must seek to
position themselves strategically in relation to the top-tier
HEIs in the West.
The paramount form of internationalization that has
evolved in Japan is thus one focused not on cosmopoli-
tanism and regional cooperation, but on economic com-
petitiveness and the strengthening of an ethnically Japanese
national identity. China, too, has evolved along a similar
trajectory.
From 1992, China initiated further economic reforms
and moved more completely towards a market economy.
This initiated China’s second phase of HE international-
ization, which saw an intensification of the import-model
(Huang 2003). China’s top-ten HEIs procured almost all of
the textbooks being used at Harvard, Stanford and MIT
(ibid.). From 2001, the Ministry of Education mandated
that from 5 to 10 % of all curricula in leading universities
be taught in English. Here we see the government’s pri-
orities of increasing the provision of English for global
competitiveness, but only for an elite group of Chinese
studying at the top.
By the early 2000s, China’s global strategy for inter-
nationalization expanded to include the exportation of
Chinese knowledge to the world (Yang 2010). A prominent
example of this is the installation of centres for learning
Chinese language and culture, known as Confucius Insti-
tutes, in partner institutions worldwide (Vickers 2007).
Another noteworthy shift occurred in 2008: those coming
to China to study (223,499) outnumbered for the first time
those leaving China to study abroad (179,800) (Su 2009
cited in Yang 2010). China has now repositioned itself in
the global higher education landscape and has assumed the
position of the importer-exporter. These shifts in the
landscape will undoubtedly impact China’s neighbours,
making the goals of policies like Abe’s Top Global
Universities more difficult to achieve.
Although marketization and competition are increas-
ingly defining HE in China, government regulation and
control have never diminished (Huang 2003). An aspect of
this control continues to be the emphasis placed on
ensuring patriotic loyalty to the state. Examples include the
‘I am Chinese’ curriculum and constraints put on academic
freedom, evidenced by the recent firing of an outspoken
academic who has been critical of the government (Redden
2013).
While varied in approach and content, it is clear that
agendas for nationalism and economic HE international-
ization are prominent in both countries. The discussion that
follows will consider the implications of these agendas in
relation to cosmopolitan aspects of internationalization and
HE as a global public good.
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Discussion
Aspects of HE internationalization and the role of univer-
sities in contributing to the global public good present a
number of dilemmas for nation-states, including those in
East Asian countries. It is clear from the trends in China
and Japan that it is competition, not cooperation, which is
motivating nation-states and HEIs to use internationaliza-
tion to position themselves strategically in the globalized
economy. To this end, inculcating loyal, patriotic identities
in citizens through state-controlled education may be
beneficial. The globalized free market is perhaps just the
latest foreign intruder that must be confronted by a resilient
and unified nation. Graduates with a strong sense of
national pride may be more willing to take jobs at home,
and work hard towards the collective goal of social and
economic prosperity for their country.
However, HE internationalization may have other, per-
haps contradictory, effects that could pose a threat to these
agendas. International activities including student and staff
mobility, research collaborations, engagement with inter-
national development organizations, and internationalized
curricula may result in the development of more cos-
mopolitan identities that could undermine unquestioning
loyalty to the nation-state.
Connected to this, a further challenge to nationalist
agendas lies in the evolution of the skill set required for
national competitiveness. Since human resources with
critical thinking skills are deemed necessary to thrive in the
global knowledge economy (Casner-Lotto and Barrington
2006), countries like China and Japan will be required to
develop citizens who may increasingly question, critique,
and challenge nationalist policies. According to Apple
(1995, p. 13), ‘schools are not ‘merely’ institutions of
reproduction, institutions where the overt and covert
knowledge that is taught inexorably moulds students into
passive beings who are able and eager to fit into an unequal
society’. Learners, especially those equipped with the
capacity for critical thought, are able to contest, reinterpret,
and even reject nationalist messages they deem illegiti-
mate. The paradox for authoritative nation-states thus
becomes clear: a critical, cosmopolitan citizenry may
possess the skills necessary for global competitiveness, but
may be less willing to uncritically accept the legitimacy of
the state. As such, reframing nationalist policies to incor-
porate more open, democratic debate, and learning to
embrace a more questioning, active and critical citizenry
may be both beneficial and necessary.
One potential solution that could enable countries like
China and Japan to develop graduates with the competen-
cies for both global competitiveness and regional cooper-
ation is through educational policy and programming for
global citizenship (GC). Curricula aimed at developing
‘global citizens’ can increasingly be found integrated into
education systems worldwide, and many universities are
adopting messages of global citizenship into their mission
statements and strategy-level institutional commitments
(Jorgenson and Shultz 2012). The types of GC programs
available to students vary dramatically, but many offer
opportunities to work in cross-disciplinary teams to address
global problems; develop leadership skills, critical thinking
abilities, and cross-cultural awareness; and provide stu-
dents chances to grapple with a range of social, political
and environmental issues currently facing world leaders
and governments today. Many GC programs challenge
preconceived notions of citizenship and encourage learners
to reflect on their rights and responsibilities in an increas-
ingly interconnected world. Providing learners in China
and Japan opportunities to engage with these debates may
be conducive to developing attitudes informed less by
nationalistic identities and more by an understanding of the
importance of mutual respect and cooperation in the face of
global problems.
In addition to developing skills and attitudes for global
citizenship, many GC programs also infuse elements of
employability into their curricula. Thus, it is possible that
while students are learning to think critically and work
together in multi-cultural teams to address global problems,
they will also be developing the skills needed to be suc-
cessful in the global knowledge economy. Developing
graduates with these skills could thus be a novel approach
to fostering global competitiveness for China and Japan.
The CCP may be averse to instituting global citizenship
curricula into higher education programming. The Eight
Honors and Eight Shames leave little room for critical thought
or active civic engagement. However, perhaps aspects of GC
could be adapted in such a way as to place more emphasis on
developing in students the ‘global competencies’ needed for
success in today’s global knowledge economy.
Another means to foster ‘critical individuals who are
capable of analysing power structures, building global
community, or tangibly helping to improve the lives of
people around the world’ is through study abroad (Lewin
2009, p. xv). In addition to implementing innovative
approaches to teaching and learning at home, HEIs in
China and Japan could look at further expanding study
abroad within the East Asian region and improving
approaches to international cooperation at the strategic
level. There are some positive signs of this occurring in
recent years. A notable development is the CAMPUS Asia
program, which aims to foster exchanges and promote
mutual understanding between students from China, Korea
and Japan. Beginning in 2012, the program has established
ten consortiums of top-ranked universities from the three
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countries, with the ideal being to eventually develop the
project into a means for regional cultural exchange like that
of Europe’s ERASMUS Program (Byun and Um 2014).
While still in its pilot phase, the success and expansion of
this program could facilitate increasing East Asian HE
regionalization and improvements in regional cooperation.
At present, the USA is currently China’s top study
abroad destination (UNESCO 2014) indicating a continu-
ing draw to higher education in the Anglosphere, and, like
Japan, a predominantly Western-facing orientation to study
abroad. However, the second most popular destination with
Chinese students for study abroad is now Japan. Likewise,
China itself has become a popular destination for study
abroad, with most students coming from Korea and Japan
(Vickers 2007). Along with increased economic interde-
pendence within East Asia in the past decade has come
increases in student mobility and de facto forms of regional
internationalization (Byun and Um 2014). Continued
efforts to expand authentic cultural exchange facilitated
through study abroad could provide Japanese and Chinese
students with new perspectives through which to compare
and reflect upon state-sanctioned patriotic education. While
not all students will be able to study abroad, those that do
can return to their countries and influence their peers
through the stories of their experiences.
China and Japan both have a long way yet to go.
Increasingly, globally-oriented elements can be found
included in moral education curricula in Japan but are still
absent in China. However, the Japanese version still estab-
lishes a clear binary between the national ‘self’ and that of the
‘other’ out in the world. As a nation, Japan has experienced
stagnation in recent years while watching its East Asian
neighbours continue to surge ahead. Accompanying this
decline has been a rise in more vocal, organized displays of
nationalism. Japan’s nationalists call for ‘an urgent injection
of patriotism, character, and moral education into young
people’ to help save the nation (Cave 2009, p. 51). Economic
decline may thus lead to an intensification of Japan’s eth-
nocentric nationalism and hamper the development of cap-
able global human resources. Another step backwards can be
found in the recent call by the government to ‘serve areas that
better meet society’s needs’ by closing or scaling back social
science and humanities departments at Japan’s 86 national
universities (Grove 2015). Globally ranked Kyoto Univer-
sity and the University of Tokyo have refused to comply, but
17 national universities plan to stop recruitment of students
to social science and humanities (HSS) courses (Social
Science Space 2015). Many in Japan and the international
community have voiced their objections to this mandate,
including the Science Council of Japan, who stated that HSS
is essential to create the global human resources that can
think critically, understand societies, and contribute to the
global community (ibid.).
While China has experienced rapid economic growth,
access to quality education and the benefits it provides are
available only to the affluent. Growing social inequalities
combined with a xenophobic nationalism inculcated
through the CCP’s patriotic education curricula threaten
both internal and regional stability, and places increasing
pressure on the regime to live up to its nationalist rhetoric
(Vickers 2007).
Nevertheless, as students enter universities that are
increasingly engaged in fostering the global public good
through transmission of culture and knowledge across
borders, graduates with cosmopolitan perspectives on
national and global issues may also increase. In response,
education in East Asia may begin to evolve away from its
nationalistic and competitive orientation.
Conclusion
In the past, the inculcation of national identities may have
helped in rallying citizens to work towards ensuring
national survival in the face of threatening foreign nations,
and ultimately towards progress and economic develop-
ment (Green 2013). Today, survival and progress still
depend on the nation-state’s ability to respond to external
threats, often manifested in the current era as the rapidly
changing economic and cultural forces of globalization.
While increasing global competitiveness through HE
internationalization may prove beneficial to individual
nation-states in the short-term, countries in the East Asian
region should consider the potential pitfalls of becoming
too singly focused on competitiveness at the expense of
mutual understanding and peaceful international relations
in the region. The continued push to create uncritical
nationalistic citizens threatens to undermine the goals of
internationalization and may be detrimental to any efforts
at HE regional cooperation and integration.
In today’s era of global competition, and especially
considering the range of social and political tensions
among countries in the region, it is important to remember
the other more cooperative rationales that inform interna-
tionalization and the traditional cosmopolitan role of higher
education. Instilling more cosmopolitan attitudes and val-
ues through education could help foster the mutual
understanding necessary for regional cooperation and
enable East Asian nations to prosper peacefully.
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